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The Wife of Bath and the Scholastic
Concept of Operatio
by

Joseph E. Grennen
Fordham University

The loathly lady of Chaucer's Wife of Bath's Tale delivers a lecture to her
reluctant swain which is remarkably gracious and persuasive, although hardly
unconventional. Her sentiments, which find a parallel in Dante's Convivio,
may be summed up in a phrase: Virtue is the true nobility. True virtue, furthermore, is a legacy from Christ, not an inheritance passed on with titles and
wealth. The chief difficulty facing a reader is to find a way of reconciling this
view with the cynical, maverick perso nality established for Alice of Bath in her
own prologue. We might suppose that Chaucer is here speaking to us over the
head of his narrator, but the gentility of the sentiment is an achievement not
merely beyond the Wife's reach , but totally at odds with the materialism she
has been preaching. The justification she offers for marital infidelity is merely
the most arrogant of a series of flagrant rejections of the received morality:
He is to greet a nygard that wolde werne
A man to lighte a candle at hi s lanterne;
He shal have never the lasse light, pardee. 1
My concern here is to examine the strategies by which Chaucer adjusted the
speech on "gentilesse" to his conception of a bitter and intelligent woman who
bridled at male affectations of superiority. Contemptuous of what she considered a bloodless, schematic approach to human motivation and behavior by
academics, she was at the same time well enough versed in the technical concepts and terminology of scholastic discourse to be able to deflate the clerkly
penchant for pontifical utterance and orotund evasion. The prologue presents us
with a woman capably orchestrating the rhetoric of a traditional anti-feminism .
But she has also become master of a lecture-hall vocabulary which tended to
reduce human complexity and individuality to the more manageable counters of
the phys ical world of "mobile being" or the abstrusities of metaphys ics. Her
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tone is one of continual, mocking self-justification. Thus, to take just one
example, Alice's Aristotelian "appetit," the teleological drive shared with all
other elements of the world of changeable being, is insisted upon in such a way
as to render morally neutral her life of ca refree libertinism. 2
Against such a backdrop, in short, the loathly lady's speech, which begins
with an earnest exhortation to gentility, virtue, and participation in a Christian
community, may seem orthodox and gracious to a degree far transcending the
potentialities of the Alice we have come to know. It is not long, however,
before the familiar accents appear (emphasis added):
Taak fyr, and ber it in the derkeste hous
Bitwix this and the mount of Kaukasous,
And lat men shette the dores and go thenne;
Yet wol the fyr as faire lye and brenne
As twenty thou sand men myg hte it biholde;
His office natureel ay wol it holde,
Up peril of my lyf, til that it dye .
Heere may ye se wel how that genterye
Is nat annexed to possessioun,
Sith folk ne doon hir operacioun
Alwey, as dooth the fyr, lo, in his kynde.
(1139- 49)
The illustration is offered as proof that "gentilesse," since it is not observed to
be an invariable characteristic of the scions of so-called "gentil" families, is not
something "planted natureely" and thus subject to the law of nature. "Office
natureel," "annexed," "possessioun" - the academic terminology is a rather
clear sign that the clerk-baiting harradin is showing through the assumed character. The word "operacioun," in particular, has a range of associations that is
worth considering. Even from the most general perspective, however, the term
nicely underscores the image of an Alice possessed of a grudging fatalism
towards the passing of youth into age, when a clerk can no longer "do / Of
Venus werkes worth his olde sho" (707-08), when the pith is gone and only the
husk is left to sell , and when sleepy old dotard s who marry are useful only as
meal tickets. The only reasonable criteria, in Alice's view, for measuring vital
worth, are performance, practice, works- the stuff of "experience." Alice
could even have found authoritative, if qualified, support for her attitude
among the schoolmen. Aquinas, for instance, commenting on a point in
Aristotle, notes that
every capacity is reduced to operation (operatio)
as to its proper perfection. Consequently, what is
principal is operation and not mere capacity, for
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act is more excellent than potency, as is proved in
the ninth book of the Metaphysics . ... From this
it is evident that for animal or man life in the full
sense is an act of sensation or thought. Indeed a
slumbering individual - since he does not actually
feel or think- does not live completely but has
half a life. 3
Aristotle himself makes action or operation the very hallmark of felicity. His
initial di scussio n of the point in the first book of the Ethics is summed up by
Bradwardine in the statement "Felicity consists in use, not in possession." 4
Bradwardine's principal concern is with the future felicity of the blessed,
described by him as an actual and perfect operation of the intellect and will,
which nevertheless allows for a disposition in these faculties which has, as he
says, a certain indifference, potentiality, and imperfection "annexed" to it. It is
clear that "possession" refers here not to material acquisitions but to psychological attainment such as a developed understanding, which would make possible the speculative "operations" in which true felicity, even for Aristotle, consists. It is noteworthy how Chaucer adapts this learned vocabulary to his
immediate purpose- how he provides an echo of the context of academic discussion in such a way as to make that context seem diminished by the more
humane setti ng in which its instruments are forced to function. The assertion
that "genterye is nat annexed to possessioun," for example, immediately suggests by its phrasing that the argument is somehow worthy of seriou s philosophical attention, even while it ostensibly limits itself to more basically
human questions of social standing, inheritance and personal behavior.
Such terms, "operacioun" in particular, were scholastic commonplaces. As
technical terms in philosophy, operatio and its correlative scientia in the first
instance refer to acting and thinking as the two perfections of the human soul.
As Gundissalinus explains it, they correspond to the faculties of sense and
reason, and dictate the basic division of philosophy into speculative science
and practical science. 5 Since most sciences are not purely one or the other this
eventuates in the separation of the majority of scientific treatises into a
theorica and a practica. Medicine, for instance, as Avicenna remarks, has two
parts: "One contains a knowledge of principles, the other the mode or manner
of treatment (operandi)." 6 Even Physics, which as Ockham notes is for the
most part a theoretical science because it does not on the whole treat of human
actions (operibus nostris), should have a part reserved , he feels, for providing
directive knowledge for performance of actions. 7
Aquinas treats the distinction between speculative and practical sciences at
considerable length in hi s commentary on Boethius' De Trinitate and elsewhere, a matter which William Wallace has discussed in detail. 8 Obvious
examples of speculative science are metaphysics and physics, and of practical
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sciences engineering and ethics (the science of producing human happiness).
The distinctive note of a practical science, as Wallace points out, is "that it is
concerned with the principles and causes of operables," and he notes that "the
end of practical science ... is operation." 9 A further distinction (again, made
by Aquinas) is also possible, between practical or operative sciences dealing
with human actions per se and those dealing with the production of external
objects (scientiaefactivae). 10 A slight variation in terminology can be noted in
the Summa philosophiae of the pseudo-Grosseteste, who specifies that an actio
which involves a material subject is more properly called an operatio, and is
seen for the most part in the productions of craftsmen (artifices). '' That
Chaucer at some point began to conceive of the Wife as a kind of parodic version of "operative scientist," standing against the speculative Clerk in particular, is, in my view, a defensible position . Those lines early in her Prologue,
apparently genuine but cancelled by Chaucer (44a-44f)Of which [prospects] I have pyked out the beste,
Bothe of here nether purs and of here cheste.
Diverse scoles maken parfyt clerkes,
And diverse practyk in many sondry werkes
Maketh the werkman parfyt sekirly;
Of fyve husbondes scoleiying am I
- may not alone be fair evidence of the extent to which Chaucer wants the
Wife to be taken as a practical scientist manque, a person with marriage rather
than, say, medicine as her field of expertise. Nevertheless, her Prologue readily
resolves itself, significantly, into the two parts of a treatise, a theorica (vv. 1183), and a practica introduced by the Pardoner's mollifying remark:
Telle forth youre tale, spareth for no man,
And teche us yonge men of youre praktike.
(186-87)
In more general usage operatio was only slightly less technical , referring to
actions performed not casually but rather as formally related to some virtue or
potency in the agent. Thus a man may operate as a horologist by designing and
making a clock, or as a moral agent by answering the claims of friendship;
Nature has her "operations," too- the processes governed by what we call
natural law; even God is said (although equivocally) to "operate" in performing miracles, bestowing grace, judging souls, and so forth. 12 The classic treatment of human operations, at least of man considered as a moral being, was
the Ethics of Aristotle. There is, in addition, good reason to consider the
Ethics, and the tradition of Christianizing commentary on that work as having
particular relevance to Chaucer's purposes in the speech on "gentilesse. " 13
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To begin with, the illustration of the operation of natural law through the
example of fire burning the same way even in the Caucasus mountains almost
certainly comes ultimately, if not directly, from Aristotle's brief discussion of
natural law, or natural justice, in the Ethics. There he distinguishes it from
statute law, which varies from place to place: "Some hold the view [he says]
that all regulations are of this kind, on the ground that whereas natural laws
are immutable and have the same validity everywhere (as fire burns both here
and in Persia) they can see that notions of justice are variable." 14
It should also be noted that justice is the su bject of one book of the Ethics
(the fifth) because acting justly towards oneself and others is an aspect of
moral virtue. There is an important and related question concerning the possibility of man's having an innate capacity for choosing the good, a notion elsewhere vigorously attacked by Aristotle. The iss ue posed in the hag's speech
concerning inherited "gentilesse" is really the same question in another form.
Aquinas, in hi s commentary on the Aristotelian argument, provides a formulation of the opposi ng position, a position he regards as erroneous. In his discussion, he introduces the image of the capacity "planted natureely":
That a person desires a proper end [they say] does
not arise from hi s own free will but must belong to
him by birth. As from birth a man has external
sight by which he correctly di stinguishes colors, so
also from birth he should have a well-disposed
internal vision by which he may judge well and
desire what is really good. Thus he must be said to
be of good birth in whom the previously mentioned
judgment has been implanted [inditum] from
birth. When a man innately has in good and perfect fashion what is greatest and best for him, this
is a perfect and truly good birth . . .. 15
The argument is naturally rejected by Aquinas, as it is by Aristotle; after
allowance is made for dispositions or inclinations wrought by planetary influence and bodily temperament, freedom of the will and individual responsi bility are of course affirmed. Hardly revolutionary is the hag's rejection of the
idea of a naturally inherited nobility of character. One may easily suppose that
Chaucer, having derived pertinent ideas from the ethical tradition , here
applied them specifically to the concept of "gentilesse."
By far the most significant feature of the Ethics, in terms of its usefulness
as a gloss on the "gentilesse" speech, is Aristotle's consideration of the way in
which virtue (virtus- power, ability, strength, but especially moral strength) is
developed. 16 Bradwardine, in the De Causa Dei, discusses at some length the
Philosopher's treatment of this point, in connection with the analogous question
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of the way in which grace comes to be present in the human soul. 17 His
analysis is especially interesting in view of Chaucer's (or the hag's) repeated
insistence on the fact that true "gentilesse," the power to live virtuously,
derives from Christ and comes in the form of divine grace. Bradwardine's chief
concern is to defend the principle that divine grace is necessary for willing the
performance of meritorious acts. That is to say, one cannot independently of
the Creator develop the power inescapably to choose the good. He sees a
potential threat to this position in Aristotle's view, stated at several points in
the Ethics, that people develop moral virtue by the successive performance of
virtuous acts. A man becomes just, temperate, and brave by continually doing
just, temperate, and brave deeds, just as a person becomes a builder by building, or (a famou s, if quaint illustration) one becomes a zither-player by playing
the zither. When we are born we are constituted to receive certain virtues, but
we bring them into increasingly perfect actualization by practice; we develop
"habits" in ourselves. Virtus ex operibus generatur ("a power is produced by a
succession of individual acts") was the familiar form of the principle. 18 Aristotle
himself seems to have recognized a difficulty, namely, that the position appears
to suppose some degree of innate capacity. Averroes, too, explicitly argued in
connection with the point that it is impossible for anything to come into being
without having initially something of that which it will have at last, and that
thus no one can come to play the zither without having possessed from the
beginning something of the art of zither-playing. An ass can not learn to play
the zither, nor a man in whom "zitherizing" is not to some degree innate. Bradwardine's own position is that a man, having a certain species or form of
zither-playing in his imagination, perfects it through practice. 19
The entire discussion is for the purpose of making a distinction between
virtues of this sort however developed or acquired, and the grace freely given
by God. Bradwardine insists that of ourselves or from other creatures we have
not the least sci ntilla of charity or grace, and he goes on to condemn the heretical view that grace is given by God so that a man can perform more easily what
he would in any case be able to do, though with more difficulty, without the aid
of grace.
Now, although the loathly lady's speech on "gentilesse" may seem unexceptionably Christian, it might nevertheless be argued that much of its special
force derives from the fact that some of the particular sentiments it expresses
are not themselves exclusively Christian in nature, and that the very structure
of the speech reflects the uniqueness of Chaucer's appreciation of the hardwon intellectual and moral stance of the central religious current of his time.
The speech assimilates acceptable pagan ideas in a framework which echoes
the scholastic struggle to adapt the Aristotelian world view, especially the
vision of the moral athlete which informs the Ethics, to the Christian world of
charity and grace. With only a slight change of terminology, statements such
as "vi leyns sinful dedes make a cherl," or "he is gentil that dooth gentil dedis,"
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can easily be accommodated to Aristotle's humanistic, pagan outlook. And the
passage,
Looke who that is most vertuous alway,
Pryvee and apert, and moost entendeth ay
To do the gentil dedes that he kan;
Taak hym for the grettest gentil man,
(1113-16)
might well find a place in the Ethics if one merely substituted for "gentil"
Aristotle's "just, temperate, and brave." Even the ambiguity may be deliberate
on Chaucer's part. Do "cherles" and "gentils" come to their villainous or virtuous perfection through repeated operations like the zither-player, or are
their actions the result of a character existing prior to the deeds? But the point
need not be pressed.
There may even be an implicit contrast intended on the precise point that
man perceived through Christian eyes, because he is unable to persevere in his
"operacioun," requires the divine operation of a God granting grace as a continual support for the performance of virtuous actions. As noted earlier, the
terminology of a God "operating" by giving man the grace to be just, pious,
wise, and blessed, with such analogies as that to the sun operating to illuminate
the world, or the farmer operating with the plow to produce food from the
field, can be found in Bradwardine and other scholastic commentators. But
this point, too, need not be vigorously urged. The hag's prayers for the grace
of "gentilesse" can stand by themselves, even if we can never decide whether or
not Alice herself is best understood as fully subscribing to the sentiments
enshrined in the speech. The complexities of her character persist to the very
end of the tale, where she herself prays for grace- the "grace t'overbyde hem
that we wedde" -and begs Christ to shorten the lives of husbands who refuse
to submit. Whether the blasphemy is meant to be genuine or facetious on the
part of the Wife, or whether the ending as a whole is to be seen as a good
natured joke or a final bit of impudence, probably depends largely on a
reader's own critical predilections. It does appear, however, that Chaucer was at
some pains to make the speech on "gentilesse," insofar as it is understood to be a
fictive creation of the Wife of Bath, seem the natural utterance of one as competent in scholastic give-and-take as Alice has previously shown herself to be.

NOTES
I. Canterbury Tales, III, 333-35, The Works of Geoffrey Chaucer, ed. F. N. Robinson, 2nd ed. (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1957). Further references will be made by line
number in the text.
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I ne loved nevere by no discrecioun,
But evere folwede myn appetit,
Al were he short, or long, or blak, or whit;
(622-24)

The last line, an obvious allusion to certain scholastic sophisms having to do with
"denomination," helps to make the more extended meaning of "appetit" (Ari stotelian
appetitus, inclination towards natural place) the relevant one.
3. St. Thomas Aquinas, Commentary on the Nico machean Ethics, trans. C. I. Litzinger, O.P., 2 vols. (Chicago: Henry Regnery, 1964) , II, 840. The fo llowing, and further
references to the Latin text of the Ethics and of the Commentary of Aquinas, will be to
Sancti Thomae Aquinatis, In decem libros Ethicorum A ristotelis ad Nicomachum
Expositio, Marietti edition (Turin, 1934):
Omnis autem potentia reducitur ad operationem, sicut
ad perfectionem propriam. Unde id quod est principale
consistit in operatione, et non in potentia nuda. Est
enim actus potior quam potentia, ut probatur in nono
Metaphysicorum .... Et ex hoc patet quod principaliter
vivere animalis vel hominis, est sentire vel intelligere.
Dormiens enim, quia non actu sentit vel intelligit, non
perfecte vivit, sed habet dimidium vitae ... . (p. 609)
4. Thomas Bradwardine, De Causa Dei, ed. Henry Savile (London, 1618), p. 235. Cf.
Aristotle, Ethics, I, xii.
5. Dominicus Gundissalinus, De divisione philosophiae, ed. Ludwig Baur, in Beitriige
zur Geschichte der Philosophie des Mittelalters, IV (Munster, 1903), 11-12, 142.
6. Avicenna, Liber Canonis (Venice, 1555), p. 3.
7. William of Ockham, Philosophical Writings: A Selection, ed. and trans. Philotheus
Boehner, O .F.M. (London: Thomas Nelson, 1957) , p. 15.
8. William A. Wallace, O .P., The Role of Demonstration in Moral Theology (Washington, D.C.: The Thomist Press, 1962). See esp. pp. 71-89.
9. Wallace, pp. 74, 77.
10. Wallace, pp. 86-87.
11. Summa philosophiae, ed . Ludwig Baur, pp. 275-643 of Die philosophischen
Werke des Robert Grosseteste, in Beitriige zur Geschichte der Philosophie des Mittelalters, IX (Munster, 1912), 376.
12. Bradwardine, De Causa Dei, p. 235.
13. See above, n. 3, for Marietti edition. I have also consulted the translation by J. A. K .
Thomson, The Ethics of Aristotle (Harmondsworth, Middlesex: Penguin Books, 1955).
14. Aristotle, Ethics, l 134b24 et seq., trans . Thomson, p . 190.
15. Litzinger, Commentary, p. 229. Cf. Ethics, I l 14a32 et seq; Marietti ed., p. 177.
16. Aristotle, Ethics, 1103al4-b3, trans. Thomson, pp. 91 - 92.
17. Bradwardine, De Causa Dei, pp . 329-33 .
18. Bradwardine, De Causa Dei, p. 331.
19. Bradwardine, De Causa Dei, p. 333. The reference to Averroes is made by
Bradwardine.

